

上海财经大学 2024—2025 学年第 1 学期教学进度表

开课院系: 经济学院 课程名称 行为经济学

总课时 32 (其中讲课 24 课时, 实验 8 课时)

讲课教师 姚澜 辅导教师: 多媒体 实验 (若“是”则在方框中打☑)

周次	讲课内容	讨论/实验	阅读	作业
1	方法和工具介绍		见下面列表 (非必须阅读)	
2	禀赋效应、现状偏差、参照依赖与损失厌恶, 心理账户	1 课时		
3	阿莱悖论、偏好逆转、前景理论	1 课时		
4	不确定性和模糊性厌恶, 艾尔斯伯格悖论	1 课时		
5	跨期选择			
6	讨价还价	0.5 课时		
7	信任和礼物交换	0.5 课时		
8	公共品	2 课时		
9	建模			
10	协作博弈	2 课时		
11	K阶(理性)考虑			
12	社会道德			
13	社会道德与市场			
14	大数据与经济决策			
15	神经经济学(经济决策的生物学模型)			
阅				

周次	讲课内容	讨论/实验	阅读	作业
读材料目录	<p>Section one: Individual decision making</p> <p>Lecture 1: Introduction of Methods and Tools:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Vernon Smith, "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science", American Economic Review, vol. 72., no. 5, December 1982, pp. 923-955. ➢ Vernon Smith, "Experimental Economics : Induced value Theory" , American Economic Review, May 1976, vol. 66, no. 2, pp. 274-279. ➢ Goeree, Jacob K., and Charles A. Holt (1999) "Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory, and Ten Intuitive Contradictions," University of Virginia, Discussion Paper ➢ Colin Camerer and Robin Hogarth "The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments" , Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1999, vol 19., pp. 7-42 ➢ Ralph Hertwig and Andreas Ortmann, "Experimental Practices in Economics: A Challenge for Psychologists?", Mimeo Berlin 2000. <p>Lecture 2: Endowment effect, Status Quo Bias, BDM, Reference dependent and loss aversion, and mental accounting</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Kahneman, Daniel. J., and Shane Frederick. 1990. "Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coarse Theorem." Journal of Political Economy, 98: 1325–48. ➢ Becker, Gordon M., Morris H. DeGroot, and Jacob Marschak. 1964. "Measuring Utility by a Single-Response Sequential Method." <i>Behavioral Science</i>, 9(July): 226–32. <p>Lecture 3: Alaxis paradox, preference reversal, prospect theory</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Allais, Maurice. 1953. "Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine." Econometrica, 21: 503–46. ➢ Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." Econometrica, 47: 263–91. ➢ Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1981. "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice." Science, 211: 453–58. <p>(prospect theory in the field: presentation)</p> <p>Lecture 4: Aversion to Uncertainty and Ambiguity, Ellsberg paradox.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Camerer, Colin, and Martin Weber, "Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity," <i>Journal of Risk and Insurance</i> 5(4), 1992, 325-370. ➢ Ellsberg, Daniel, "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms," <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> 75, 1961, 643-669. ➢ Epstein, Larry G., "A Definition of Uncertainty Aversion," <i>The Review</i> 			

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	<p><i>of Economic Studies</i> 66, July, 1999, 579.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Epstein, Larry G., and Tan Wang, “Intertemporal Asset Pricing Under Knightian Uncertainty,” <i>Econometrica</i> 62(3), March 1994, 283-322. ➤ Gilboa, I., and Schmeidler, D., “Maxmin Expected Utility with a Non-Unique Prior,” <i>Journal of Mathematical Economics</i> 18, 1989, 141-153. ➤ Kelsey, David, and Quiggin, John, “Theories of Choice Under Ignorance and Uncertainty,” <i>Journal of Economic Surveys</i> 6, 1992, 133-153. ➤ Schmeidler, David, “Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity,” <i>Econometrica</i> 57(3), May 1989, 571–587. ➤ <p>Lecture 5: Intertemporal choice:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Loewenstein, O'Donoghue, and Frederick. A review of intertemporal choice. <i>J Economic Literature</i>, 90,: 351-401, 2002, and in ADVANCES. ➤ Laibson, "Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting," <i>QJE</i> 1997, 443-478 and in ADVANCES. ➤ Angeletos, M. et. al. (2001) “The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical Evaluation,” <i>Journal of Economic Perspectives</i>, August, 47-68. <p><u>Section two: behavioral game theory</u></p> <p>Lecture 6: Bargaining</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Werner G�uth, Rolf Schmittberger and Bernd Schwarze (1982), “An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining,” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization</i>, 3, 367–388 . ➤ Gary Bolton and Rami Zwick (1995) “Anonymity versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining,” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, 1995, 48, 287–292. ➤ Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith (1996), “Social Distance and Other–Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games,” <i>American Economic Review</i>, 86, 653–660. ➤ Brit Grosskopf (2003), “Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with Responder Competition,” <i>Experimental Economics</i>, 6, 141–158. ➤ Richard H. Thaler (1988), “The Ultimatum Game,” <i>Journal of Economic Perspectives</i>, 2, 195–206. ➤ Colin Camerer and Richard H. Thaler (1995), “Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners,” <i>Journal of Economic Perspectives</i>, 9, 209–219. <p>Lecture 7: Trust and Gift–Exchange</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe (1995), “Trust, 			

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	<p>Reciprocity, and Social History,” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, 10, 122–142.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Klaus Abbink, Bernd Irlenbusch and Elke Renner (2000), “The moonlighting game: An experimental study on reciprocity and retribution,” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization</i>, 42, 265–277. ➢ Chaim Fershtman and Uri Gneezy (2001), “Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An Experimental Approach,” <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i>, 351–377. 4 ➢ Jörn P. W. Scharlemann, Catherine C. Eckel, Alex Kacelnik and Rick K. Wilson (2001), “The value of a smile: Game theory with a human face,” <i>Journal of Economic Psychology</i>, 22, 617–640. ➢ Catherine C. Eckel and Rick K. Wilson (2004), “Is trust a risky decision?,” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization</i>, 55, 447–465. ➢ Iris Bohnet and Richard Zeckhauser (2004), “Trust, risk and betrayal,” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization</i>, 55, 467–484. ➢ Ernst Fehr and Armin Falk (1999), “Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market,” <i>Journal of Political Economy</i>, 107, 106–134. <p>Lecture 8: Communication, cheap-talk, punishment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Charness, G. and Martin Dufwenberg, 2006. “Promises and Partnership,” <i>Econometrica</i>, 74: 1579-1601. ➢ Cooper, R. et al, "Communication in Battle of the Sexes," <i>Rand Journal</i>, Vol 20, Winter 1982, pp. 568-586. ➢ Palfrey, Thomas R., and Howard Rosenthal (1991) “Testing for Effects of Cheap Talk in a Public Goods Game with Private Information,” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, 3:2 (May), 183-220 ➢ Crawford, Vincent, 1998, “a survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk”, <i>Journal of economic theory</i>, 286-298. ➢ Charness, Gary, Ninghua Du, Chunlei Yang, and Lan Yao, “Promises in contract design”, forthcoming EER, <p>Lecture 9: Public goods</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter (2000), “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments,” <i>American Economic Review</i>, 90, 980–994. ➢ R. Mark Isaac, James M. Walker and Arlington W. Williams (1994), “Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence Utilizing Large Groups,” <i>Journal of Public</i> 			

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	<p><i>Economics</i>, 54, 1–36.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ James Andreoni (1995), “Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?,” <i>American Economics Review</i>, 85, 891–904. ➤ James Andreoni (1995), “Warm–Glow versus Cold–Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments,” <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i>, 110, 1–21. ➤ Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter (2000) “Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity,” <i>Journal of Economic Perspectives</i>, 14(3), 159-181. ➤ Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter (2002) “Altruistic Punishment in Humans,” <i>Nature</i>, 415, 137-140. ➤ Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher (2003) “The Nature of Human Altruism,” <i>Nature</i>, 425, 785-791. <p>Lecture 10: coordination</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles A., (2005). An Experimental Study of Costly Coordination, <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> 51, 349-364. ➤ Weber, A. Roberto, (2006). Managing Growth to Achieve Efficient Coordination in Large Groups, <i>American Economic Review</i> 96(1), 114-126. ➤ Brandts, J., and Cooper, D., (2006). A Change Would Do You Good. . . An Experimental ➤ Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations, <i>The American Economic Review</i> 96(3), 669-693. ➤ Crawford, Vincent P., (1991). An “Evolutionary” Interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio ➤ and Beil’s Experimental Results on Coordination, <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> 3, 25-59. ➤ Selton, R., (1995). An Axiomatic Theory of A Risk Dominance Measure for Bipolar ➤ Games with Linear Incentives, <i>Games and Economics Behavior</i> 8, 213-263. ➤ Harsanyi, J. and Selten, R., (1988). A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, ➤ MIT Press, Cambridge. ➤ Van Huyck, J.B., Battalio, R.C. and Beil, R.O., (1990). Tacit Coordination Games Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure, <i>American Economic Review</i> 80, 234—248. <p>Lecture 11: Modeling</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt (1999), “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,” <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i>, 114, 817–868. ➤ Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (2000), “ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition,” <i>American Economic Review</i>, 90, 			

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	<p>166–193.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ 5 ➤ Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin (2002), “Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests,” <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i>, 117, 817–869. ➤ Martin Dufwenberg and Georg Kirchsteiger (2004), “A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity,” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, 47, 268–298. ➤ Armin Falk and Urs Fischbacher (2006), “A Theory of Reciprocity,” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, 54, 293–315. <p><u>Section 3: Extension of lab experiment</u></p> <p>Lecture 12: Neuroeconomics (biological models of economic decision making)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ <u>Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics</u> by Colin Camerer and George Loewenstein (Feb. 3, 2003) ➤ <u>Anticipation of Increasing Monetary Reward Selectively Recruits Nucleus Accumbens</u> by Brian Knutson, Charles M. Adams, Grace W. Fong, and Daniel Hommer, <i>Journal of Neuroscience</i>, Vol. 21, (2001) pp. 1-6 ➤ <u>Does Rejection Hurt? An fMRI Study of Social Exclusion</u> by N. I. Eisenberger, M. D. Lieberman, and K. D. Williams, <i>Science</i>, Vol. 302, (Oct. 2003) pp. 290-292 ➤ <u>The Neural Basis of Economic Decision Making in the Ultimatum Game</u> by A. G. Sanfey, J. K. Rilling, J. A. Aronson, L. E. Nystrom, and J. D. Cohen, <i>Science</i>, Vol. 300, (June 2003) pp. 1755-1757 <p>Lecture 13: Field Experiments</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Angrist, J., D. Lang and P. Oreopoulos “Incentives and Services for College Achievement: Evidence from a Randomized Trial,” <i>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</i> (2009) 1(1): pp. 1-xx. ➤ Angrist, J. and V. Lavy “The Effect of High School Matriculation Awards: Evidence from Randomized Trials,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 114 (2004). ➤ Banerjee, A.V., S. Cole, E. Duflo and L. Linden “Remedying Education: Evidence from Two Randomized Experiments in India,” <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> (2003): pp. 1235-1264. ➤ Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., Rasul, I., 2005. Social preferences and the response to incentives: Evidence from personnel data. <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> 120(3), 917-962. 			